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Ifyou wish to become informed on the present history of
nuclear arms control negotiations in the 1970s and 80s,
read Strobe Talbott's trilogy: Endgame, Deadly Gambits,
and Master ofthe Game. Ifyou wish to become informed on
the in-depth, historical beginnings of the atomic age, read
Richard Hewlett's trilogy: The New World, 1939-1946,
Atomic Shield, 1947-1952, and the subject of this review,
the recently released Atomsfor Peace and War, 1953-1961.
Since Hewlett was the official historian of the Atomic En
ergy Commission, writing the history of the AEC from
AEC and National Security Council classified documents,
one might be concerned that history might be written to
justify the past actions of the AEC. I am convinced, how
ever, that Hewlett and Holl deserve both great respect and
gratitude for unbiased reporting and honeSt analysis. Pri
marily, Hewlett and Holl write history, without many val
ue judgments. If something was clearly silly, like the nu
clear-propelled airplane, they say so by implication. Ike
was dismayed that the AEC would spend funds on this
unlikely project just because the air force wanted it, yet his
administration continued to fund it. For something much
more complicated, like Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace,
they refrain from passing judgment, but rather inform us
by using classified documentation to tell us what was at
issue, and how it was decided. This book tells the story of
the conflict between two quite different men: Eisenhower
and Lewis Strauss, the Chairman of the AEC. The authors
buttress present-day revisionist historians by showing that
Eisenhower was an activist president, leading his govern
ment to ban all nuclear weapons tests ( 1958-61 ), to negoti
ate a cutoff on the production of plutonium and highly
enriched uranium ("the fissile cutoff'), and to promote
the peaceful atom with safeguards through the creation of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On the
other hand, as one might expect, Strauss was very protec
tive of the AEC's right to produce plutonium and carry out
weapons tests.
In order to focus this review, I will mainly cover just two
topics: first, the Atoms for Peace Plan; and second, the
nuclear test ban moratorium. Thus we will skip such inter
esting topics as the Oppenheimer trial and the development
of the commercial nuclear fuel cycle in the US. The title of
the book, Atomsfor Peace and War, aptly expresses Eisen
hower's dream to reach out to the world with peaceful nu
clear power, and somehow tame the military atom (while
also continuing to build Polaris and other weapons). In
retrospect, he did a rather good job of carrying out this
lofty plan, considering the hand he was dealt and the uncer
tain information that was at his disposal. Early on in 1953,
Ike decided that more candor and honesty were necessary

on the effects ofnuclear weapons, stating that, " ...personal
ly I think the time has arrived when the American people
must have more information on this subject, if they are to
act intelligently.. .! think the time has come to be far more,
let us say, frank with the American people than we have
been in the past" (p. 55). By informing the public more
about the effects of megaton blasts, but not informing the
public about the danger to uranium miners and the fall-out
at St. George, Utah, the goals of "candor" were only par
tially fulfilled. By amending the Atomic Energy Act of
1946, some of the secrets of the atom were unclassified in
order to establish the commercial fuel cycle. Atoms for
Peace ultimately creates a dilemma. Greater access by oth
er countries to nuclear methods and special nuclear materi
al has, of course, eased their transition to the bomb. This
doesn't sound like Atoms for Peace, but rather Atoms for
War. However, the opposite side of the coin is created by
the carrot of supposedly cheaper nuclear power, which has
encouraged nations to give up some of their sovereignty by
(1) abstaining from nuclear weapons and (2) allowing in
ternational inspectors into their nuclear facilities. A very
good result is that all but a half-dozen of the non-nuclear
weapon states that have nuclear power have agreed to the
bargain of safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. How
ever, one wonders if Ike was somewhat misled on the ulti
mate dilemma of Atoms for Peace when he stated to the
United Nations on 8 December 1953 that, "The ingenuity
of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under
which such a bank of fissionable material can be made es
sentially immune to surprise seizure." What was he refer
ring to? Denatured plutonium with 240pU won't prevent
weapons; it only complicates the production of quality
weapons. The plutonium produced in the commercial sec
tor is more accessible than nonexistent plutonium. How
ever, Ike did initiate a somewhat sturdy regime, the best
one we have, in that famous speech by stating that the nu
clear nations "begin now and continue to make joint contri
butions from their stockpiles of normal uranium fission
able materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency"
to be established under the aegis of the United Nations (p.
72). It was hoped that Atoms for Peace would somehow
solve future proliferation problems of the atom, break the
disarmament stalemate with the Soviets, and enhance the
prestige of the US (p. 215). Eisenhower's aim was to lessen
Cold War tensions and to siphon off weapon-grade materi
al from existing nuclear stockpiles (p. 225). As the policy
process unfolded, it is apparent that the US government
did not discuss and understand all the paths to nuclear
proliferation (p. 222). Power reactors produce about 250
kg per year of reactor-grade Pu that can be made into lower
quality weapons by less sophisticated nations. Initially the
US was going to require "the return of all spent fuel and
nuclear by-products for reprocessing in the US"; however,
this was not required in the early agreements of coopera
tion with other countries (p. 227). We are still grappling
with these issues today. By offering to contribute 100 kg of
fissionable material, the process gained momentum. At

first the Soviets were skeptical about proliferation from
Atoms and Peace, but in time they joined in. By 1955, the
peaceful atom was used as a tool to entice other nations to
be helpful with our foreign policy (p. 239). Easy financing
from the Export-Import Bank helped launch a large ex
port industry. All of these negotiations took place before
nuclear power had become a reality; our first commercial
power plant at Shippingport first operated on 2 December
1957. The driving force behind the policy was Ike's strong
belief that without a peaceful atom the world was doomed.
In 1957, the National Security Council concluded that the
US "would try to persuade other governments to accept the
international safeguard provisions in the agreements for
cooperation..." (p. 439). Ultimately, the Nuclear Nonpro
liferation Treaty and tightened export laws have nudged
most nations toward "full-scope" safeguards, but only
after a period of years to convince other nations to accept
inspectors ofother nations on their soil. The authors do not
pass final judgment on the Atoms for Peace plan. In my
opinion, Atoms for Peace, on balance, was a success, con
sidering that ultimately there are no technical barriers to
the bomb for medium-sized countries. Certainly, we have
accelerated some near-term proliferation by technology
transfer and training with India and Israel, but an interna
tional regime has been established under the IAEA, the
NPT, and the nuclear supplier nations. This is no small
accomplishment. Only under Ike's leadership could this
have been possible. Only time will tell if the world has
gained more than it has lost in terms of the vertical and
horizontal arms race. It is hard to imagine world stability
without these norms.
The Castle Bravo shot on 1 March 1954 tested the US's
first "dry" hydrogen bomb. The fallout from the 6 megaton
Castle Bravo gave doses as high as 1000 REM, 200 miles
from the explosion. Unfortunately, the Lucky Dragon fish
ing vessel was in its path, 90 miles away, and all 23 Japanese
crew members suffered from radiation exposure. As one
can imagine, public opinion on nuclear testing was greatly
inflamed, encouraging Eisenhower to look for a solution.
Strauss and the AEC Commissioners did cover things up as
much as possible: "Within the Commission, however,
there was much less evidence of compassion for the fisher
men and more concern about the security and scientific
implications" (p. 177). As early as April 1954, Eisenhower
and Dulles decided to explore the possibility of ending all
thermonuclear testing (p. 223). Yet, over the years, Eisen
hower continued to test nuclear weapons. "He expressed
his frustration at having to conduct extensive tests on the
one hand while professing readiness to suspend testing in a
disarmament program on the other" (p. 457). Interest
ingly enough, the early US proposals were tied to the fissile
cutoff, a ban on the production of plutonium for weapons, a
proposal that favored the US at that time. The day after the
conference of experts adjourned in Geneva, Eisenhower
announced on 22 August 1958 that the US would unilater
ally suspend all nuclear weapons testing, provided the nu
clear powers could establish an effective inspection system
and make substantial progress on arms control (p. 546).
Unilaterally, Ike had changed US and NATO policy. He
had established a comprehensive test ban (0 kiloton limit)
without the sophisticated verification technologies that we
have today. Ultimately the Soviets joined this moratorium,

which lasted until 1 September 1961, when the Soviets
broke the moratorium. By today's standards, this was an
incredible set of circumstances, a unilaterial US act, soon
followed by the Soviets, for a total ban of nuclear tests
which could not be verified down to the zero kiloton level,
and which did not allow for inspections. Ike did admit that
he favored continued underground testing, but he conclud
ed that world opinion against testing was more powerful
than thermonuclear weapons. And Ike moved over the ob
jections of Lewis Strauss and Edward Teller, who wished
to promote the testing of clean "bombs" and the peaceful
nuclear explosions of Project Plowshare. Ike told Strauss
that the AEC alternatives "led nowhere but to an indefinite
arms race; at least Dulles' p0sition might be a step toward
general disarmament" (p. 546). And it did work-for 3
years. Had the moratorium been maintained, we would not
be faced today with the destablizing MIRVs that are placed
on the SS-18 and MX missiles. This history lesson remains
with us today. Now that dangers from nuclear fallout from
nuclear testing have been eliminated by testing under
ground, public opinion against testing is not nearly as
strong as in the 1950s. Nevertheless, underground nuclear
testing does allow further modernization of weapons such
as the earth-penetrating warhead, and that is why the Com
prehensive Test Ban Treaty is still an issue today.
These two events, the Atoms for Peace Plan and the nu
clear test moratorium of 1958-61, are impressive. Looking
back to the prerevisionist days, I recall that Eisenhower
was demeaned as a not-very-bright, golf-playing, former
general. The authors argue that he deserved a much better
epitaph than that. His farewell address gave us an indica
tion that there was a much greater dimension to this man:
In the councils of government, we must guard against
the acquistion ofunwarranted influence, whether sought
or unsought, by the military-industrial complex...Only
an alert knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper
meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery
of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that
security and liberty may prosper together...Partly be
cause of the huge costs involved, a government contract
becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosi
ty.. .In holding scientific research and discovery in re
spect, as we would, we must also be alert to the equal and
opposite danger that public policy could itself become
the captive of a scientific-technological elite...Because
this need is so sharp and apparent, I confess that I lay
down my official responsibilities in this field with a defi
nite sense of disappointment...As one who knows that
another war could utterly destroy this civilization which
has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of
years-I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is
in sight (p. 563).
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